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0. Introduction 
0.1 In recent years, under the banner of a “right to 
justification” (or Recht zu Rechtfertigung, in the pithier German 
version), Rainer Forst has put forward a novel and distinctive 
project in normative political theory. One could say that 
Forst's overall aim is to reconcile some insights from 
Frankfurt School critical social theory--notably an awareness 
of the potential for ideological distortions in power-justifying 
discourse--with a set of broadly liberal first-order normative 
commitments. While at first blush that combination may be 
reminiscent of Habermas' later work, Forst's contribution is 
distinctive in both its influences and its central philosophical 
underpinnings. In terms of influences, as the present 
discussion will make clear, Forst is much more directly and 
constructively engaged with contemporary Anglophone 
political philosophy. More importantly, his foundational 
philosophical commitments are in some ways both more 
diffident of power and more thoroughgoingly Kantian that 
those of the later Habermas--in a word, they are more critical. 
As in the original Frankfurt School usage, 'critical' refers to 
the Kantian project of investigating knowledge, experience 
and morality transcendentally, i.e. in terms of their conditions 
of possibility. Forst's project can be understood as an inquiry 
into the conditions of possibility of normativity--an account of 
the features of the human condition that make us subject to 
normative considerations. That, in turn, illuminates what it 
takes for particular normative considerations to apply to 
particular agents, and what that entails for the purposes of 
regulating human interaction through social norms and 
political institutions.      
 The specific aspect of Forst's project that we wish to 
focus on is his attempt to draw a connection between power 
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and justification. Forst draws this connection primarily 
conceptually, though we will also consider whether a 
normative connection may be drawn within his framework. At 
any rate, Forst's key insight is this. If we understand power as 
operating by furnishing those subjected to it with reasons, 
then we create a space for the normative contestation of any 
exercise of power. He calls this the noumenal understanding of 
power. It is noumenal in the Sellarsian sense of being located 
in the  "space of reasons":           
...in characterizing a situation as an exercise of power, we 
do not merely give an empirical description of a state of 
affairs or a social relation; we also, and primarily, have to 
place it in the space of reasons, or the normative space of 
freedom and action (2015a: 112)       
 That passage neatly encapsulates the critical nature 
of Forst's approach: notice the rejection of a positivist 
approach that would seek to reduce power to an observable 
behaviour. Rather, Forst maintains, power is a relation 
brought about by a specific class of reasons some agents may 
give others, and they are reasons insofar as others may 
recognise them. More precisely, for Forst power is "the capacity 
of A to motivate B to think or do something that B would not have 
thought or done" (2015a: 115, emphasis in original). And that 
motivation is, conceptually, the product of the recognition of 
one or more reasons (to think or do) that A implicitly or 
explicitly provided to B. Reason-recognition, importantly, is 
more than a mere external stimulus--hence the rejection of 
behavioural, empirical accounts of power. Furthermore, Forst 
draws an important distinction between the use of force and 
the use of power, where the former is not an instance of the 
latter (as in many empirical accounts), but rather a product of 
its failure: "In contrast to the exercise of physical force or 
violence, power rests on recognition" (2015a: 115). If a state 
jails me for violating its laws, it is not exercising power over 
me; it is acting as a consequence of the realisation of a failure 
in its exercise of power:           
 ...if, as sometimes happens, the threat by the 
blackmailer or the kidnapper is no longer taken seriously, 
their power disappears. They can still use brute force and 
kill the kidnapped person, but that is rather a sign of 
having lost power ... The exercise and effects of power are 
based on the recognition of a reason--or better, and more 
often, of various reasons--to act differently than one 
would have acted without that reason. (2015a: 116)       
 Setting aside, for now, whether that distinction 
between power and force can adequately capture the role of 
coercion in the exercise of power in politics (as opposed to 
other contexts), we can now lay out what we take to be the 
bare bones of Forst's argument as follows:       
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1. To be a subject of power is to be moved by 
reason(s). 
2. Reasons cannot move subjects without 
recognition. 
3. Therefore, power requires recognition. 
---      
4. Recognition requires justification.      
--- 
5. Therefore, power requires justification.       
  
0.2 This chapter’s argument is in two main parts. In the next 
section we will try to show how, while that is clearly a valid 
argument, it is unsound, and so that (5) is not warranted. Our 
main contention will be that (4) is false, though we will also 
cast some doubt on (1). But our objections to (1) will only be 
exploratory, so we do not think we can undermine the 
inference to (3), which in itself is a significant achievement, 
and one with potentially fruitful offshoots other than (5), as 
we will briefly touch upon below. The gist of our arguments is 
this. Against (1), we try to show that on most plausible 
accounts of political freedom, some freedom-restrictions 
commonly attributed to the successful exercise of power 
would perplexingly count as failures of power on Forst's view 
(sub-section 1.1). Against (4), we argue that on the most 
plausible account of reason-recognition, namely an 
appropriateness of response account, a justification relation is 
only a sufficient but not necessary condition for recognition 
(sub-section 1.2).  
 In the second section of this essay, we consider 
whether Forst might defend (5) not by appeal to a conceptual 
connection between power and justification, but by appeal to 
the normative connection that his theory of the right to 
justification posits. Roughly, Forst argues that a universal 
right to justification of power in terms of reciprocal and 
general reasons can be established by reconstructing the 
presuppositions of rational discourse in moral contexts. We 
respond that Forst can establish the existence of such a right 
only if he reconsiders the transcendental aspirations of his 
theory. The upshot, then, is in an invitation to Forst to reframe 
his otherwise illuminating project of transcendentally 
establishing a necessary connection between power and 
justification.  
 
1. Does Power Require Justification? 
1.1 Why think that to be a subject of power is to be moved by 
reasons? One appealing feature of that view of Forst's is that, 
on most plausible construals of reasons and reason-giving, it 
necessarily makes power an object of normative enquiry. The 
space of reasons is a space in which competing sets of 
considerations must be balanced against one another. In the 
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context of contemporary Anglophone political philosophy that 
may not even seem something we need to establish--after all, 
the field is customarily characterised as a normative inquiry 
into the justifiability of exercises of political power and of our 
attitudes towards them. But notice how on that construal of 
normative political theory--the prevalent one in Anglophone 
philosophy--power is but an accidental object of study. As 
Bernard Williams put it, much contemporary (Anglophone) 
political philosophy is a form of applied ethics, concerned 
either with implementing moral ideals through political 
instruments ('enactment model'), or with setting moral 
boundaries to what one may do in politics ('structural model') 
(2005: 1). Either way, power is just a contingent instrument or 
even an unfortunate occurrence in need of constraining, rather 
than a conceptually indispensable focus of politico-
philosophical enquiry. Forst's approach, on the other hand, 
restores power to its central place, thus reconnecting critical 
theory's longstanding preoccupation with power structures 
with the normative concerns of contemporary analytic political 
philosophy (for the former often eschews prescription for 
diagnosis-critique, and the latter, as we have seen, tends to be 
oblivious to the importance of power relations--a problem 
highlighted in much recent realist literature).      
 Given that context, it is even more striking that Forst 
should try to develop "a normatively neutral notion of power" 
(2015a: 111). It would arguably have been easier to build his 
view around an explicitly moralised notion such as domination 
or oppression. Those concepts are indeed usually 
characterised as subsets of power, specifically problematic 
kinds of social relations. Forst's project is more ambitious. 
From a normatively neutral account of power Forst wants to 
derive which features of power are suitable objects for 
normative judgment. And, as we have touched upon above, 
that feature is the justificatory, reason-giving nature that Forst 
ascribes to power. Before examining that move in detail, it 
may be worth stopping to briefly consider for starting with the 
broader picture of power, as opposed to delving directly into 
an account of what makes particular instances of the exercise 
of power obligatory, permissible, or impermissible (to borrow 
the moralising terminology of contemporary Anglophone 
political philosophy). One important affordance of this more 
ambitious strategy is that it makes it impossible to write off 
any instance of power exercise as 'natural' or 'par for the 
course' in any sense that would place it above (or beneath) the 
threshold of normative contestation--hence the rejection of 
positivist, purely behavioural accounts of power.      
 Given that motivation, the question then becomes: is 
it feasible to provide an account of power that is both plausible 
and normatively neutral enough to not be reducible to the 
familiar moralised accounts of domination, exploitation, 
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oppression, and the like? The answer, we suggest, has to do 
with the account of freedom implicit in Forst's theory of 
noumenal power. To be sure, it's not as if the very presence of 
an implicit account of freedom is the problem. As we have 
seen, Forst explicitly says that the noumenal space of reasons 
is "the normative space of freedom and action" (2015a: 112). 
Besides, the freedom literature contains several well-
developed normatively neutral accounts of freedom (e.g. 
Carter 1999).1 Rather, our focus should be on spelling out 
Forst's commitments with regard to freedom, and on assessing 
whether they are plausible in themselves as well as whether 
they are well suited to his project. 
 
1.2 We now move on to our criticism of what we have 
identified as the fourth step in Forst's argument, namely the 
view that in order to be a subject of power one needs to 
recognise the power as such. In our reconstruction of Forst's 
argument, that view depends on the prior premise that 
recognition is what enables reasons to move subjects; and that, 
in turn, is motivated by the view that power moves its subjects 
through reasons--the first premise, which we cast doubt upon 
in the previous sub-section. It's worth noting, however, that 
the idea that (reason) recognition requires justification2 has 
independent plausibility, and so interesting implications of its 
own. We shall try to criticise it ways that do not depend on 
our earlier argument either, and so without impugning Forst's 
theoretical motivations for this view, which from now on we 
will call the justificatory recognition view.      
 Arguably the prima facie appeal of the justificatory 
recognition view rests in the intuitive idea that recognising 
that reason applies in a given situation is a matter of applying 
some normative standard, and in turn applying normative 
standards is a practice of justification--it involves adducing 
considerations for why a certain belief, feeling, or action 
conforms to a certain class of criteria. To use a mundane 
example, I (correctly) recognise that I have reason to feel 
offended when someone deliberately shows me the soles of 
their feet only if the context is such that applying the norms of 
Arab etiquette is appropriate. That is to say, the norms of 
Arab etiquette justify my taking offence. The person with 
whom I become offended is owed a justification, and I can 
provide one by showing that Arab etiquette is appropriate in 
our context and that it tells us that deliberately showing the 
soles of one's feet is offensive, and that, therefore, I have 																																																								
1 We shall set aside the question of whether accounts of freedom such as 
Carter's, which are intended to be compatible with a broadly behavioural, 
empirical philosophy of social science (in the tradition inaugurated by 
Felix Oppenheim and others), can be squared with Forst's anti-positvism. 
2 So, strictly speaking, the object of this sub-section is the conjunction of 
propositions (2) and (4) in the argument with attribute to Forst. 
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reason to feel offended. It doesn't matter, for the purposes of 
that example, whether adherence to etiquette is connected to 
any power structures. The example merely illustrates the 
connection between reason-recognition and (relevant) 
normative standards, i.e. between reason-recognition and 
justification.       
 Now, what the example shows is that whenever I can 
provide a justification it is the case that I produce reasons that 
can be recognised as such. But our contention is that Forst's 
justificatory recognition view requires a stronger claim, 
namely that only justification can provide recognisable 
reasons. In other words, Forst claims that justification is 
necessary and sufficient for reason recognition, whereas we 
claim that it is merely sufficient. Before arguing for our claim, 
it is worth pointing out its import for Forst's theory of the 
right to justification. Simply put, if it possible to recognise 
reasons in the absence of a justification, then reason-
responsiveness of power does not suffice to ground the right to 
justification. Just because humans can be (and arguably 
inevitably are) subjects of power, it doesn't follow that they 
are "justificatory beings" (2015b: 37, our translation).       
 To see why reason recognition does not require 
justification, we will need a brief detour to distinguish reason 
giving from reason recognition. Our contention is indeed that 
Forst lumps them together, whereas they are distinct, and only 
the former requires justification--even if we assume, as we do 
for the sake of the argument, that any reason given is ipso 
facto recognisable.3 So the question, for us, is whether one can 
recognise that an agent is providing them with a reason (to 
act, say) even though that agent fails to provide--and perhaps 
couldn't provide--a justification for why that course of action 
is required, or is a good idea, and so on. To be sure, when 
Forst talks about "orders of justification" (2015a: 117) he 
doesn't imply that those in power must always do the 
justificatory labour--literally formulate and offer the reasons 
why those subjected to their power should comply. Rather, he 
points out how the noumenal view of power can account for 
power structures (2015a: 118). So what matters is not that 
someone in power possess--let alone present--a justification. 
What matters is that the justification is somehow available to 
its addressees, the subjects of power. We are talking here of a 
shared understanding of what Bernard Williams would call a 
"legitimation story" (2005):4 "Every social order in general ... is 
based on a certain understanding of its purpose, aims, and 
rules--in short, it is a normative order as an order of 																																																								
3 For a discussion of the difference between the accessibility and the 
acceptability of justificatory reasons see Rossi (2014). 
4 On the role of legitimation stories in Williams’ theory of legitimacy see 
Beetz & Rossi (2016). 
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justification" (2015a: 119). 5  The question for us, then, 
becomes: can there be a functional, compliance-inducing 
shared understanding of a normative order whose recognition 
does not depend on its justification? Or, put differently, can 
subjects of power recognise that they have reason to comply 
even in the absence of a justification?      
 We will now try to answer those questions 
affirmatively while remaining in agreement with Forst on his 
normative and cognitive understanding of motivation (for 
compliance with power). An affective rather than cognitive 
model of motivation6 would provide a more direct route to a 
critique of Forst's position, but it would depend on premises 
we cannot defend here. Without wading too deeply into the 
quagmire of the debate on reasons, we can say that a 
compelling way to understand them as normative and 
cognitive notions is to think of reason relations7 as eliciting 
responses in human agents. Those responses are not mere 
stimuli of a mechanistic sort, but rather behaviours--actions, 
beliefs, feelings--with an intentional content we can ascribe to 
the agent who is answerable to the reason(s) at hand. To say 
that reason relations are normative in character, then, is to say 
that we can evaluate the (degree of) appropriateness of a 
response. And, like Forst, we can be cognitivists about the 
grounds of that evaluation: that a response is appropriate can 
be true or false.8      
 With that conceptual apparatus in place, we can now 
rephrase our questions as follows. Can a subject's response to 
an instance of the exercise of power be appropriate even in the 
absence of a justification for the power? It seems to us that, in 
the light of that reformulation, it is easy to answer 
affirmatively, pace Forst. Recognising that someone has power 
over you just means seeing that you have reason to do as she 
says--the burden is on Forst to show that such a response 
would be inappropriate in the absence of a relevant 
justification. For instance, the deciding factor for me may be 
that I fear the power holder's secret police, but that is not a 
justification in Forst's sense of the term. At the end of the day, 
if the illuminating notion of noumenal power is to remain as 																																																								
5 Notice the consonance, which Forst more or less explicitly acknowledges, 
with what has come to be known as the practice-dependent approach in 
normative political theory (Sangiovanni 2008). 
6  On this distinction see Skorupski (2010: 239ff). Relatedly, for an 
intriguing argument that tries to push Forst away from his rationalism see 
Sangiovanni (2014). 
7 Here we loosely follow Skorupski (2010: 35ff). The complex position he 
defends is compatible with Forst's way of writing about reasons for the 
purposes of our argument, which at any rate does not depend on 
Skorupski's cognitive irrealism about reasons (though it is compatible with 
it). 
8 We will remain neutral as to whether that truth-value depends on a 
truthmaker (or not, as in Skorupski's irrealist cognitivism). 
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neutral as it needs to be, but also as realistic as Forst claims it 
is (2015a: 118), it cannot be made to enshrine a right to 
justification. 
 
2. Can the Right to Justification Normatively Link 
Power and Justification? 
2.1 If the arguments in the previous section are right, then 
Forst might attempt to defend a necessary connection between 
power and justification in a different way. While we have 
argued that his analysis of the idea of noumenal power cannot 
be made to enshrine the right to justification, he develops a 
different argument for this right in other parts of his work. 
The argument we have in mind defends the right to 
justification as a constitutive principle of practical reason that 
can be established by reconstructing the presuppositions of 
rational discourse in moral contexts. This argument differs 
from the argument considered in Section 1 in that it is a 
practical transcendental argument—it aims to ground the right 
to justification in the presuppositions of a certain kind of 
practice, namely the practice of rational moral discourse.  
 The problem with the argument is that, so far as we 
can see, it cannot satisfy two of Forst’s core aims in developing 
it, and thus cannot establish connection between power and 
justification that Forst seeks. First, Forst rejects “ideal theory” 
approaches to theorizing about justice that aim to articulate a 
model of a perfectly just society in favor of a “practice-
immanent” approach that employs the right to justification to 
offer emancipatory critiques of actually existing relations of 
rule and domination (2017: 151). 9  Second, Forst aims to 
develop a critical theory of justice that is “reflexive” in the 
sense it contains the resources to critique its own limitations 
and shortcomings. This capacity for self-scrutiny is essential if 
a theory of justice is to avoid a “metaphysical slumber” that 
arbitrarily privileges its own normative recommendations over 
the competing “narratives of justification” undergirding 
relations of rule and domination (2014b: 11).10  
 The challenge for Forst’s theory arises once we 
consider individuals seeking to make the right to justification 																																																								
9 Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971), of course, is generally taken to 
exemplify the ideal theory approach in political philosophy. For more on 
the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, see Stemplowska and 
Swift (2012).  
10 Forst explicitly adopts this ideal of reflexive self-scrutiny from Kant, who 
famously says that “Reason must subject itself to critique in all its 
undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any 
prohibition without damaging itself … The very existence of reason 
depends upon this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose 
claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of 
whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, 
without holding back” (1781/87, A 738–739, B 766–767).  
 
	 9 
socially effective in an existing political community. The right 
to justification requires that relations of power “must be 
justified in a reciprocal and general manner, where one side 
many not simply project its reasons onto the other but has to 
justify itself discursively” (2014a: 34). According to Forst, the 
right to justification generates a requirement of “fundamental” 
justice to secure the political rights, institutions, capabilities, 
information, and opportunities necessary for “all those who 
are subjected to a normative order [to] be its co-authors as 
equal participants and normative authorities in adequate 
justificatory practices that critically reflect on and constitute 
that order” (2017: xx). Once a just “basic structure of 
justification” that respects all relevant individuals’ right to 
justification has been established, citizens can work through 
its discursive participatory mechanisms to achieve a 
“maximally” just distribution of goods (2011: 262).  
 In line with Forst’s practice-immanent approach to 
theorizing about justice, suppose that we consider a political 
community in which many citizens’ right to justification has 
not been secured by their basic political structure. Of course, 
this is true of most existing political communities, including 
most liberal democracies. Consider the United States, where 
the instrumentalising influence of money, widespread political 
disenfranchisement of minority voters (bolstered by deep 
structural racism), relative lack of women representatives in 
Congress (bolstered by deeply structural sexism), and many 
other phenomena pose significant barriers to realizing the kind 
of deliberative equality the right to justification requires. 
Forst’s theory implies that individuals ought to reform the 
basic structure of such a political community so that it respects 
all individuals’ right to justification. Of course, what political 
reforms the right to justification requires will depend on the 
nature of the existing relations of domination in a given 
community; in the case of the United States, for example, 
plausible candidates for reform include campaign finance 
reform, criminal justice reform, significant wealth 
redistribution, policies addressing the gendered division of 
labor, and so on.  
 Now, it is a fact about all existing liberal democracies 
that citizens deeply and pervasively disagree about moral and 
philosophical matters. Indeed, John Rawls famously argues 
that such disagreement is the inevitable result of the good-faith 
use of reason under the very conditions of freedom of thought 
and expression that all liberal democracies protect (Rawls 
2005: 144). Whether or not we accept Rawls’s view here, it is 
obvious that Forst’s argument for the right to justification and 
his view of the political recommendations it generates will be 
intensely controversial in all existing liberal democracies. As 
such, individuals who attempt to reform their basic structure 
so that it respects all subjects’ right to justification will be 
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doing so in face of deep and pervasive disagreement. For 
example, when individuals appeal to the right to justification 
to advocate for political reforms that limit wealth inequality or 
keep wealth inequality from influencing democratic politics, 
they will be pushing for policies that are intensely 
controversial in the United States on the basis of arguments 
that are themselves intensely controversial.  
 The problem is that it is difficult to see how 
individuals who push for such policies can avoid arbitrarily 
privileging the right to justification and the arguments for it 
over competing narratives of justification. Recall that the right 
to justification requires that “one side many not simply project 
its reasons onto the other but has to justify itself discursively.” 
Yet, individuals who advocate for the political 
recommendations the right to justification generates in the 
face of widespread disagreement appear to be projecting their 
reasons onto those who reject that principle. Specifically, such 
individuals fail to satisfy the requirement that relations of 
power be justifiable to all individuals subject to that power 
based on reasons they can appreciate as reasons. Of course, if 
all individuals in a given liberal democracy were to accept the 
right to justification as the correct standard for evaluating how 
political power ought to be exercised, then perhaps the 
political recommendations the principle generates would be 
interpersonally justifiable. However, to theorize about a 
political community in which all individuals accept the right to 
justification as the correct standard for evaluating political 
power would be a paradigmatic instance of the sort of ideal 
theorizing that Forst rejects. In existing liberal democracies—
the very liberal democracies that Forst’s practice-immanent 
approach seeks to theorize about—many individuals will reject 
Forst’s argument for the right to justification. The point we 
want to emphasize here is that advocating for policies based 
on the right to justification in the face of such disagreement 
appears to involve arbitrarily privileging that right and the 
argument for it over competing narratives of justification 
found in diverse liberal democracies.11  
 
2.2 It might seem that this objection ignores the capacity for 
reflexive self-scrutiny that Forst builds into his theory. 12 
Insofar as his theory contains the resources to critique its own 
limitations and shortcomings, the response goes, then 
individuals who advocate for the policies the right to 
justifications recommends are not arbitrarily privileging that 
principle and the argument for it over competing narratives of 
justification. Rather, they are justifiably doing so, since that 
principle and the argument for it are licensed by the 																																																								
11 This objection bears similarities to the so-called self-defeat objection to 
public reason theories of political legitimacy. See Wall 2002; 2013.  
12 For an incisive critique on this point see McNay 2016. 
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foundational critical standard the theory advances—namely, 
the right to justification itself. But we do not think that this 
response is convincing. The problem is that the response 
presupposes that the right to justification is the correct 
standard for evaluating political power. The fact that the right 
to justification passes self-inspection licenses its use as a 
justificatory grounds for political power only if the right to 
justification is the correct standard for evaluating justificatory 
grounds for political power.  
 To illustrate the point, consider a deliberative 
exchange between two members of an existing liberal 
democracy: Maxine—who accepts the right to justification as 
the correct standard for evaluating political power—and 
Shivani—who endorses a utilitarian standard for evaluating 
political power. Suppose that Maxine publicly advocates for a 
particular tax policy because that policy is the best way of 
respecting individuals’ right to justification. Shivani rejects the 
policy because it fails to satisfy the utilitarian standard she 
endorses. If Maxine continues to press for the policy in the 
face of Shivani’s utilitarian objections, then it appears Shivani 
can rightly accuse Maxine of projecting Maxine’s reasons onto 
Shivani and thus arbitrarily privileging Maxine’s preferred 
narrative of justification over Shivani’s preferred utilitarian 
narrative of justification. If Maxine then goes on to defend 
herself by arguing that she is not arbitrarily privileging the 
right to justification and her argument for it because the right 
to justification passes the test of reflexive self-scrutiny, Shivani 
can complain that she rejects the very standard that Maxine 
employs to license her use of the right to justification as a 
grounds for political power: namely, the right to justification 
itself. 
 The most promising response to this objection gets us 
to the metaethical core of Forst’s theory. Forst might argue 
that the right to justification is inescapable in a way that renders 
it appropriate to privilege itself over competing standards in 
justifying the use of political power. Recall that Forst defends 
the right to justification as a constitutive principle of practical 
reason, one that can be established by reconstructing the 
presuppositions of rational discourse in moral contexts. Forst 
might thus argue that the right to justification represents the 
context-transcending normative bedrock of all interpersonal 
moral deliberation and, as such, individuals cannot 
discursively challenge it without presupposing it. So, when 
Shivani discursively challenges Maxine’s appeal to the right to 
justification as a justificatory ground for the use of political 
power, Maxine can be observe that Shivani herself is 
presupposing the very critical standard she seeks to challenge 
and, as such, is caught in a kind of performative contradiction. 
Shivani is, in this respect, guilty of irrationality.  
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 The problem with this response is that it appears to 
be inconsistent with how Forst thinks of the normative status 
right to justification, and Forst’s reasons for thinking of the 
normative status of that principle as he does are compelling. In 
order to see what we have in mind, notice the similarity 
between the response articulated in the previous paragraph 
and Habermas’s well-known attempt to ground a 
universalization constraint on moral norms. Habermas argues 
that such a constraint can be found in the rational 
presuppositions of interpersonal deliberation, in particular in 
the conditions for discursively redeeming a validity claim to 
how we ought to act in planning contexts. When we make 
such claims, Habermas argues, we presuppose that they are 
justified only if they “meet (or could meet) with the approval 
of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse.” (1990: 66). Forst famously argues that Habermas 
fails to demonstrate the objective normativity of the 
universalization constraint he seeks to ground. While 
Habermas arguably shows how individuals are to justify moral 
claims if they are to be engaged in genuine interpersonal 
planning, Forst argues, Habermas does not show that 
individuals ought to justify such claims in according with a 
universalization constraint.  
 How does Forst’s own view escape this problem? 
According to Forst, while the right to justification is a 
constitutive principle of rational discourse in moral contexts, 
individuals must have a higher-order practical “insight” that 
there is a moral duty to comply with that principle (2011: 35). 
Having such an insight is what it means to regard others as 
ends in themselves rather than as means. We find the nature of 
insight somewhat obscure. But putting this worry aside, the 
deeper problem is that one does not have to have this insight 
in order to engage in rational moral discourse—one can fully 
well engage in rational moral discourse without having the 
moral insight that Forst believes is essential to establishing the 
normativity of the right to justification. And if one does not 
have this insight—if one believes, instead, that a competing 
standard for evaluating political power is correct—then 
individuals who employ the right to justification as a 
justificatory ground for political power appear to be projecting 
their reasons onto others. So, individuals cannot vindicate 
privileging that principle over competing standards in 
justifying political power by appeal to the idea that the 
principle is an escapable presupposition of rational moral 
discourse. Even if this is true, it does not show that 
appreciating the reasons to comply with that principle is an 
escapable presupposition of rational moral discourse. So, we 
believe that Forst must do more to show that his theory can 
satisfy his own conditions for a successful critical theory of 
justice. Ultimately, it appears that individuals who accept the 
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right to justification and cannot escape privileging that right in 
justifying political power –at least if they want to bring about a 
political order that secures that right. 
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